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Abstract 
∎ Although cross-border flight has been high on the international agenda 
for several years, the more wide-spread phenomenon of internal displace-
ment has received scant political attention, despite the fact that it pro-
motes conflict and hinders development. 
∎ The problem is exacerbated when internal displacement continues over 
an extended period. If a large population group is denied the ability to 
exercise its basic as well as its civil rights for years, there are high costs 
and political risks for society as a whole. 
∎ Internal displacement can have many causes. If it becomes a protracted 
phenomenon, this points to fundamental political shortcomings. Hence, 
the issue is a politically sensitive matter for the governments concerned, 
and many of them consider offers of international support as being un-
due interference in their internal affairs. 
∎ At the global and regional levels, legislative progress has been made 
since the early 2000s. However, the degree of implementation is still inad-
equate and there is no central international actor to address the concerns 
of IDPs. 
∎ The political will of national decision-makers is a prerequisite for the pro-
tection and support of those affected. This can be strengthened if govern-
ments are made aware of the negative consequences of internal displace-
ment and if their own interests are appealed to. 
∎ The German government should pay more attention to the issue of inter-
nal displacement and make a special effort to find durable solutions. 
The most important institutional reform would be to reappoint a Special 
Representative for IDPs who would report directly to the UN Secretary-
General. 
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Issues and Recommendations 
On the Run in Their Own Country. 
Political and Institutional Challenges 
in the Context of Internal Displacement 
According to the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), 70.3 million people world-wide 
were fleeing wars and violent conflicts at the end of 
2018. Nearly 60 per cent of these people were so-called 
internally displaced persons, that is, people who were 
forced to leave their homes without crossing an inter-
national border. Furthermore, a far greater number of 
people have been displaced due to natural disasters, 
climate change, large-scale development projects, and 
organised crime, but they remain in their own coun-
tries. 
Internally displaced persons (IDPs) often have a 
similar need for protection as cross-border refugees, 
but they are not entitled to international protection. 
Despite the alarming figures, there is a lack of politi-
cal attention being given to the problems arising from 
internal displacement. There are a number of reasons 
for this. Internal displacement occurs almost exclu-
sively in poorer regions of the world. Unlike cross-
border flight, it therefore does not directly affect 
wealthy states, which have a major influence on the 
international agenda. In addition, many affected 
states deny the existence or extent of internal dis-
placement, since this exposes fundamental political 
deficits and failures on their part. Furthermore, 
reliable data is scarce and the quality is poor. Since 
the legal status of IDPs is no different from that of 
their fellow citizens, and because they often live scat-
tered throughout the country, they remain statis-
tically “invisible”. 
For a long time, internal displacement was consid-
ered to be primarily a humanitarian challenge. In 
1998, the United Nations (UN) published its UN Guid-
ing Principles on Internal Displacement and expand-
ed the prevailing view to include a human rights per-
spective. Although they are not legally binding, the 
Guiding Principles are nevertheless considered a mile-
stone in the development of international standards 
of protection. There are now a variety of national and 
regional instruments for the protection of IDPs. How-
ever, the level of implementation remains deficient. 
The inadequacy of the measures taken so far is re-
Issues and Recommendations 
SWP Berlin 
On the Run in Their Own Country 
May 2020 
6 
flected in the data: The number of IDPs resulting 
from conflict has more than doubled since 1998. 
This increase is not only due to new displacements. 
Equally relevant is the increasing duration of individ-
ual instances of displacement. If internal displace-
ment becomes protracted, it is insufficient to cover 
only the basic material needs of those affected. In 
addition, access to education, livelihood opportuni-
ties, and political participation must be a priority. If 
this does not happen, there is a risk that the discrim-
ination and marginalisation of large segments of the 
population will become permanent. In addition to 
individual human rights violations, structural chal-
lenges can arise: urbanisation trends intensify; demo-
graphic changes cause local or regional power struc-
tures to shift in ways that are likely to lead to conflict; 
and IDPs and host communities compete for resources. 
The resulting inequality can fuel conflicts and ham-
per development, thus hindering longer-term peace 
and reconstruction processes. 
It is therefore inaccurate to view internal displace-
ment as the unavoidable outcome of conflicts and 
disasters. Instead, protracted internal displacement 
points to deeper political distortions. When govern-
ments are unwilling or unable to meet their respon-
sibilities to their own citizens, short-term emergen-
cies create longer-term problems. Experiences of the 
past decades show that the challenges resulting from 
internal displacement can only be overcome with co-
operation from the affected states. The central – but 
often missing – prerequisite for finding solutions is 
that the respective governments must acknowledge 
the problem. 
This is where development-oriented arguments can 
make an important contribution. In essence, it is a 
matter of appealing to the self-interests of the affected 
governments. They must be made aware that internal 
displacement not only has negative implications for 
those directly affected, but that it also generates high 
costs for society as a whole, such as falling productivity 
levels, declining tax revenues, and political instabil-
ity. Moreover, development policy offers the means 
for tackling the structural challenges associated with 
internal displacement. 
Current efforts at the UN level to strengthen inter-
national cooperation through the Global Compact 
on Refugees (Global Refugee Compact) and the Global 
Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration 
(Global Migration Compact) exclude the phenomenon 
of internal displacement. This is symptomatic of the 
continuing contradictions between national sover-
eignty and an international responsibility to stand 
up for those in need of protection, and the resulting 
fragmentation of responsibilities at the international 
level. It is true that more and more humanitarian, 
human rights, and development-oriented actors are 
working to remedy internal displacement. However, 
there is a lack of flexible and multi-annual financial 
resources, and there is no central actor who can bring 
the various perspectives together and serve as a strong 
political advocate for IDPs in the UN system. In Janu-
ary 2020, a UN High-Level Panel on Internal Displace-
ment was set up for one year to develop new ap-
proaches. This is a positive development. However, 
in order to bring about longer-term changes, this ini-
tiative should be transformed into a permanent state-
led process under the aegis of a group of directly 
affected states. 
For the international community, internal dis-
placement is a challenge whose security and develop-
mental impacts remain underestimated. The German 
government should give greater priority to this issue, 
both at the international level and in bilateral ex-
changes with the countries concerned. At the inter-
national level, it would be a step in the right direction 
if the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of 
Internally Displaced Persons were better funded and 
better staffed. However, the appointment of a Special 
Representative on Internal Displacement, who reports 
directly to the UN Secretary-General, would carry 
much more weight. Bilaterally, the German govern-
ment should work to ensure that IDPs are systemati-
cally taken into account in national development 
plans; it should also invest in improved data collec-
tion and analysis, and make a concerted effort to find 
durable solutions. 
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The UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 
(Guiding Principles) define IDPs as “persons or groups 
of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or 
to leave their homes or place of habitual residence, in 
particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects 
of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, 
violations of human rights or natural or human-made 
disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally 
recognised State border”.1 In contrast to the legal cat-
egory of (cross-border) refugees that is enshrined in the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(Geneva Convention), the definition in the Guiding 
Principles is purely descriptive and does not establish 
a claim for international protection. The rights of 
IDPs are not special rights, but rather are derived 
from their status as citizens or residents of a state.2 
Therefore, the primary responsibility for their protec-
tion lies with the respective government. 
The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 
(IDMC) estimates that 33.4 million new cases of inter-
nal displacement occurred in 2019.3 Despite these 
high figures, the topic receives little attention. One 
of the reasons for this is poor data. However, political 
reasons are paramount. For wealthy Western states, 
internal displacement is not a pressing problem, as 
they are not directly affected by it. According to cal-
culations by the World Bank, at the end of 2015, 
99 per cent of all IDPs resulting from conflict were 
 
1 United Nations, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. 
Introduction: Scope and Purpose, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, Annex, 
11 February 1998, 5, https://undocs.org/E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 
(accessed on 4 March 2020). 
2 Walter Kälin, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. 
Annotations, Studies in Transnational Legal Policy, no. 32 
(Washington, D.C.: American Society on International Law, 
2000), 2. 
3 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Global 
Report on Internal Displacement 2020 (Geneva, April 2020), 1. 
in developing or emerging countries.4 In contrast 
to cross-border displacement, wealthy regions of 
the world are also not directly exposed to the con-
sequences of internal displacement. The level of 
political attention is correspondingly low. The annual 
ranking of “forgotten crises” published by the Nor-
wegian Refugee Council shows that major displace-
ment incidents which remain confined within the 
borders of the affected country are regularly neglected 
by the media. It also shows that the corresponding 
international appeals for assistance are especially 
underfunded.5 
Many governments deny that internal 
displacement occurs on their terri-
tory because they fear international 
sanctions or a loss of reputation. 
Additionally, many governments deny that inter-
nal displacement occurs on their territory because 
they fear international sanctions or a loss of reputa-
tion. This is not only the case when state actors are 
directly involved in the displacement. Internal dis-
placement due to natural disasters can also indicate 
a lack of state capacity to act, especially when dis-
placement lasts for a long time and the situation of 
those affected becomes more permanent. Since the 
level of public interest in internal displacement is low 
and many governments do not admit that it exists in 
their country, the issue barely plays a role at the inter-
national level. This omission has far-reaching con-
sequences. If state actors fail to fulfil their respon-
 
4 World Bank, Forcibly Displaced. Toward a Development 
Approach Supporting Refugees, the Internally Displaced, and Their 
Hosts (Washington, D.C., 2017), 18. 
5 Norwegian Refugee Council, The World’s Most Neglected 
Displacement Crises (online), 5 June 2019, https://www.nrc.no/ 
shorthand/fr/the-worlds-most-neglected-displacement-crises/ 
index.html (accessed 16 October 2019). 
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sibility to protect IDPs, it is not only those directly 
affected who suffer. Society as a whole is confronted 
with additional costs and the threat of further con-
flicts, as well as the issue of onward movements 
across international borders. 
Displacement-specific Discrimination 
Although IDPs have the same legal standing as fellow 
citizens who are not affected by displacement, in prac-
tice they are often barred from exercising their rights. 
For example, forced displacement rips people out of 
their professional and social environments, so that 
livelihood opportunities and access to state services 
such as education and health are lost. Often, the 
documents required to register children at school in 
their new place of residence or to exercise political 
rights such as participating in elections are missing. 
The same applies for accessing the legal system, mak-
ing it difficult to sue for compensation payments 
or the recovery of property. Those affected are often 
traumatised and are also at increased risk of becom-
ing victims of sexual or other forms of violence. If 
they do not have a permanent place of residence, they 
lack the planning horizon necessary to gain a foot-
hold again professionally. In conflict regions, IDPs 
have on average much higher rates of infant mor-
tality and malnutrition than cross-border refugees 
and other population groups affected by conflict.6 
Even if the security conditions allow for a return 
to the place of origin, the consequences of internal 
displacement are often long-lasting. This applies, 
for example, to cases where the original housing 
conditions were based on customary law or where 
property ownership was not sufficiently documented. 
Societal Costs 
Recent research findings indicate that the economic 
costs of internal displacement can cancel out the 
developmental gains that individual countries have 
accrued over years or decades. The direct costs and 
losses resulting from internal displacement alone – 
such as loss of income and the cost of housing, health 
care, education, and security – account for a sub-
 
6 See Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, 
People Affected by Conflict. Humanitarian Needs in Numbers (Brus-
sels, December 2013), 17. 
stantial share of gross domestic product in some 
countries; in extreme cases, such as in the Central 
African Republic, it can be more than 10 per cent.7 
There are also long-term negative effects. This in-
cludes, for example, the fact that future income and 
tax revenues will be reduced, since the schooling 
of children and young people will be interrupted or 
shortened due to displacement. Poorer countries are 
particularly hard hit by this, because their inhabit-
ants are more vulnerable from the outset, and the 
negative consequences of displacement are not 
cushioned by personal savings or state benefits.8 
Humanitarian actors have started 
to emphasise the developmental 
relevance of protracted 
internal displacement. 
Such negative consequences are particularly 
serious in the case of protracted displacement or 
recurring cycles of displacement.9 When people are 
displaced several times in quick succession – which 
is common both as a result of violent conflict and in 
areas with a high risk of flooding and earthquakes – 
each new instance of displacement causes further 
losses and burdens. Humanitarian actors have started 
to emphasise the developmental relevance of pro-
tracted internal displacement. They argue that an 
effective approach to the challenges arising from this 
is essential if the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) enshrined in Agenda 2030 are to be met.10 
Conflict-promoting Potential 
The link between violent conflicts and internal dis-
placement can be reciprocal: Internal displacement is 
not only a regular consequence of armed conflict, but 
it can also contribute to the geographical expansion 
 
7 Christelle Cazabat and Marco Tucci, Unveiling the Cost 
of Internal Displacement (Geneva: IDMC, February 2019), 6. 
8 Ibid., 5. 
9 See Alexandra Bilak and Avigail Shai, “Internal Displace-
ment beyond 2018: The Road Ahead”, Forced Migration Review 
59 (2018): 49–51 (51). 
10 See Walter Kälin and Hannah Entwisle Chapuisat, 
Breaking the Impasse. Reducing Protracted Internal Displacement 
as a Collective Outcome, OCHA Policy and Studies Series (New 
York, NY: United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA], 2017), 2. 
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or shifting of conflicts.11 A number of mechanisms 
are at work here. When people in civil wars are dis-
placed by state actors, those affected sometimes ally 
themselves with armed non-state actors. In other 
situations, they are defenceless against exploitation 
by such actors.12 Case studies from Uganda and 
Darfur show that places with a high density of IDPs 
can serve as places of refuge or as weapons depots or 
recruitment areas for rebel groups.13 
The relevant literature lists a number of possible 
factors that could also link disaster-induced internal 
displacement to an increase in violent conflict. These 
include competition for scarce resources, the forced 
coexistence of different ethnic groups, and growing 
discontent when governments fail to provide adequate 
support to populations affected by natural disasters.14 
However, a direct connection has not yet been proven 
empirically.15 Beyond severe human rights violations, 
the interplay between internal displacement and 
violent conflicts has particularly serious consequences 
in terms of foreign and security policy if it destabilises 
countries in the long term and leads to cross-border 
movements. 
 
11 Heidrun Bohnet, Fabien Cottier and Simon Hug, 
“Conflict-induced IDPs and the Spread of Conflict”, Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 4 (2018): 691–716. 
12 Sarah Kenyon Lischer, “Security and Displacement in 
Iraq”, International Security 33, no. 2 (2008): 95–119; Héloïse 
Ruaudel, Armed Non-State Actors and Displacement in Armed Con-
flict (Geneva: Geneva Call, 2013), 8–13. 
13 See Robert Muggah, “Protection Failures: Outward and 
Inward Militarization of Refugee Settlements and IDP Camps 
in Uganda”, in No Refuge: The Crisis of Refugee Militarization in 
Africa, ed. Robert Muggah (London: Zed Books, 2006), 89–
136; Clea Kahn, Conflict, Arms, and Militarization: The Dynamics 
of Darfur’s IDP Camps (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2008), 35. 
14 Nils Petter Gleditsch, Ragnhild Nordås and Idean 
Salehyan, Climate Change, Migration and Conflict: The Migration 
Link, Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series (New York, NY: 
International Peace Academy, May 2007); Rafael Reuveny, 
“Climate Change-induced Migration and Violent Conflict”, 
Political Geography 26, no. 6 (2007): 656–73. 
15 Heidrun Bohnet, Fabien Cottier and Simon Hug, Conflict 
versus Disaster-induced Migration. Similar or Distinct Implications 
for Security? Paper Prepared for Presentation at the 55th ISA 
Annual Convention, Toronto, 26–29 March 2014. 
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As with cross-border flight, internal displacement 
is caused by a combination of social, economic, and 
political drivers and acute triggers. Wars and violent 
conflicts, natural disasters, large infrastructure proj-
ects, and high rates of violent crime fall into the cat-
egory of acute triggers. Poverty, marginalisation, and 
state discrimination are among the most important 
structural drivers. The triggers, in turn, can be divided 
into two categories: those that directly involve state 
actors and those that do not (see Table 1).16 This dis-
tinction is relevant because the question of state 
involvement can influence how openly state author-
ities deal with internal displacement, and whether 
or not they accept external support. 
Triggers 
Depending on the trigger, the quality of the available 
data on internal displacement varies. In principle, 
however, they are far less reliable than data on cross-
border displacement. The available statistics are mostly 
projections of selectively collected data. 
Wars and Violent Conflicts 
The best documented cases are internal displacements 
due to wars and violent conflicts. In addition to direct 
combat operations, the fear of being recruited into 
(para-)military units or the loss of sources of income 
due to conflict can also be reasons for displacement. 
In the course of a civil war, ethnic minorities are 
often disproportionally affected and are sometimes – 
as was the case during the Bosnian War of the early 
1990s – actively displaced as part of an “ethnic cleans-
ing”. Civil wars generally trigger larger waves of dis-
 
16 The sharp dividing line between the two categories is 
purely schematic and cannot take into account the grey 
areas that actually exist: violent conflicts are also carried out 
by non-state actors, private companies are responsible for 
large infrastructure projects, and state actors are involved 
in criminal networks. 
placement than wars between states.17 A specific 
dilemma is particularly pronounced in the case of 
conflict-induced displacement: State actors are often 
directly or indirectly involved in displacement, but 
at the same time the state is also responsible for pro-
tecting its own citizens.18 IDPs are particularly vulner-
able in this situation because, unlike cross-border 
refugees, they are still on the territory of those 
responsible for their displacement, and no other 
authority is responsible for their protection. 
State actors are often involved in 
conflict-induced displacement. 
Figure 1 (p. 13) shows that the number of IDPs 
resulting from conflict fluctuated moderately be-
tween an average of 20 to 25 million from 1990 up 
until 2012. Since 2013, there has been a sharp rise, 
to more than 40 million. This was largely caused by 
the Syrian civil war, but the number also reflects the 
unstable situations in Iraq, Yemen, and Libya. The 
almost uninterrupted increase in the total number of 
IDPs due to conflict since the end of the 1990s cannot, 
however, be attributed solely to the new displace-
ments that occur every year. Another reason is that 
durable solutions are found only for a minority of 
IDPs. As a result, the duration of individual instances 
of displacement steadily increases, meaning that the 
group of people affected grows from year to year.19 
According to recent surveys, there are conflict-
induced IDPs in 61 countries world-wide.20 However, 
 
17 See World Bank, Forcibly Displaced (see note 4), 45. A cur-
rent example is Syria, which with 6.6 million IDPs is currently 
the most severely affected country. 
18 See Adam G. Lichtenheld, “Explaining Population Dis-
placement Strategies in Civil Wars: A Cross National Analy-
sis” (to be published in International Organization in 2020). 
19 See Kälin and Chapuisat, Breaking the Impasse 
(see note 10), 16. 
20 See IDMC, “2019 Internal Displacement Figures by 
Country”, Global Internal Displacement Database, https://www. 
internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data 
(accessed 3 May 2020). 
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for years a small group of states has been responsible 
for the vast majority of these cases. For example, at 
the end of 2019, more than three-quarters of all con-
flict-induced IDPs were in just 10 countries, at least 6 
of which – Syria, Colombia, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Nigeria, Sudan, and Iraq – have been 
among the 10 most-affected countries for at least five 
years (see Figure 2, p. 13). 
The geographic overview in Figure 2 makes it clear 
that, aside from in war zones, conflict-induced inter-
nal displacement occurs predominantly in states with 
weak governance structures. The significant overlap 
with the main countries of origin of cross-border refu-
gees also indicates that, in cases of displacement, there 
is often a continuum between internal and cross-
border movements: Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan are among 
the 10 most-affected countries in both categories. 
From a development perspective, another category 
of countries is of particular interest: those that are 
both affected by internal displacement and host large 
numbers of cross-border refugees from other coun-
tries. Sudan and Ethiopia, for example, are among the 
10 most-affected countries world-wide in these two 
categories.21 In Latin America, the Venezuelan refu-
gee crisis threatens to destabilise Colombia. 
Natural Disasters and Slow-Onset 
Environmental Changes 
Internal displacement resulting from environmental 
changes is referred to as “disaster displacement”. This 
category includes displacement due to sudden-onset 
 
21 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), Global Trends. Forced Displacement in 2018 (Geneva, 
June 2019), 17. 
natural disasters such as hurricanes, floods, tsunamis, 
earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and forest fires, as 
well as forced relocation as a result of gradual environ-
mental changes such as desertification or sea-level 
rise.22 So far, statistics have primarily been collected 
on displacements resulting from sudden-onset dis-
asters. The available data show that, every year, far 
more people leave their homes as a result of natural 
disasters than as a result of wars and violent conflicts, 
and that high numbers also occur in wealthy coun-
tries such as the United States. Disaster-induced dis-
placement is subject to greater fluctuations than con-
flict-induced displacement (see Figure 3, p. 14). 
These strong annual fluctuations can be explained 
by the fact that violent conflicts gradually spread and 
intensify, whereas natural disasters are distinct events 
that cause many people to flee at a given time. In 
2010, for example, floods in just two countries – 
China and Pakistan – forced 26.2 million people to 
leave their homes. This was significantly more than 
the total number of all disaster-induced internal dis-
placements in 2011, a year in which there were no 
natural disasters of comparable dimensions.23 How-
ever, the apparent fatefulness of disaster-induced 
displacement often masks deeper structural dispari-
ties. Members of poor and marginalised groups, for 
example, are more likely to settle in flood-prone 
areas, live in dwellings that are not earthquake-proof, 
and have no reserves that would allow them to sur-
vive climate-related crop failures.24 
 
22 For a typology of relevant environmental changes, 
see IDMC, Displacement Due to Natural Hazard-induced Disasters. 
Global Estimates for 2009 and 2010 (Geneva, June 2011), 7. 
23 Ibid., 13. 
24 IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement 2019 (Geneva, 
May 2019), 83. 
Table 1 
Causes of internal displacement – a typology 
 Direct state participation No direct state participation 
Triggers Wars and violent conflicts Natural disasters and slow-onset  
environmental changes 
 Large development and  
infrastructure projects 
Organised crime 
Drivers Poverty 
Societal marginalisation 
Structural discrimination 
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Like conflict-induced displacement, the bulk of 
disaster-induced displacement is concentrated in a 
small group of countries. In 2019, for example, more 
than 80 per cent of the new cases arising were from 
just 10 countries. Most of these are located in South-
East Asia and the Pacific, as many countries in these 
regions are affected by seasonal storms and flood-
ing.25 A number of countries have high rates of both 
conflict-induced and disaster-induced internal dis-
placement. In Africa these include Ethiopia, Niger, 
Nigeria, South Sudan, and Sudan, and in Asia include 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, and the Philippines.26 
Large Development and 
Infrastructure Projects 
Large-scale projects designed to promote the economic 
development of a country often involve the resettle-
ment of certain population groups. This is a relatively 
well-documented phenomenon in the construction 
of dams. Especially in India and China, entire regions 
have been flooded.27 Urban renewal initiatives, min-
ing projects, and infrastructure projects such as the 
construction of railway lines may also mean that 
people have to leave their homesteads. Reliable fig-
ures do not exist, but estimates suggest that 10 to 15 
million people are affected every year.28 Particularly 
in strongly affected countries, government agencies 
refuse to categorise this form of migration as internal 
displacement, as it is deemed to be an inevitable out-
come of modernisation efforts and because, ideally, a 
balance has been struck between the interests of the 
affected residents and the interests of the population 
as a whole.29 
 
25 The countries with the highest number of new disas-
ter-related internal displacement cases in 2019 were: In-
dia (5,018,000), the Philippines (4,094,000), Bangladesh 
(4,086,000), China (4,034,000), United States (916,000), 
Iran (520,000), Mozambique (506,000), Ethiopia (504,000), 
Somalia (479,000) and Indonesia (463,000). 
26 See IDMC, “2019 Internal Displacement Figures by 
Country” (see note 20). 
27 World Bank, Resettlement and Development. The Bankwide 
Review of Projects Involving Involuntary Resettlement 1986–1993, 
Environment Department Papers, no. 32 (Washington, D.C., 
March 1996). 
28 Nadine Walicki, Michael J. Ioannides and Bryan Tilt, 
Dams and Internal Displacement. An Introduction, Case Study 
Series (Geneva: IDMC, April 2017), 2. 
29 See Nadine Walicki, Expert Roundtable on Displacement Caused 
by Development. Event Summary (Geneva: IDMC, August 2017), 6. 
Data gaps 
Geneva-based IDMC brings together all available data on 
internal displacement, making it the authoritative source 
for up-to-date statistics in this area. Nevertheless, the avail-
able data remain patchy. The reasons for this are mani-
fold. On the one hand, many IDPs do not appear in the 
official surveys because they are scattered throughout the 
country and are difficult to distinguish from other poor 
population groups. On the other hand, the question of 
who is counted as an IDP depends on the national context. 
For example, whereas in some countries the children of 
IDPs are not included in the statistics, in others the status 
of IDP is “inherited” by the next generation – even if the 
original IDPs are already locally integrated or have settled 
permanently.
a
 Moreover, especially in countries with weak 
social security systems, the support services provided for 
IDPs may encourage people who are not affected by displace-
ment to register.
b
 Finally, statistics on internal displace-
ment always have a political dimension and are therefore 
used for political purposes. For example, affected govern-
ments present declining figures to demonstrate their 
ability to act or to prove that an internal conflict is under 
control. High figures, on the other hand, serve to maintain 
territorial claims or signal the need for support. 
There is a lack of standardised survey methods on 
internal displacement and no consensus on when internal 
displacement is considered to have ended. To remedy this 
situation, the UN Statistical Commission (UNSC) established 
an Expert Group on Refugee and Internally Displaced 
Persons Statistics (EGRIS) in 2016 to develop a comprehen-
sive statistical framework on internal displacement.
c
 The 
Joint Data Center on Forced Displacement, co-founded 
by UNHCR and the World Bank in October 2019, also fo-
cusses on improving the quality and availability of data 
on internal displacement. 
a See Zara Sarzin, Stocktaking of Global Forced Displace-
ment Data, Policy Research Working Paper no. 7985 
(Washington, D.C: World Bank Group, February 2017), 
14. 
b See UN Ukraine, “Pensions for IDPs and Persons 
Living in the Areas Not Controlled by the Government 
in the East of Ukraine”, Briefing Note, February 2019, 1. 
c In March 2020, UNSC adopted the International 
Recommendations on IDP Statistics proposed by 
EGRIS. See https://unstats.un.org/unsd/statcom/51st-
session/documents/BG-item-3n-international-
recommendations-on-IDP-statistics-E.pdf (accessed 
20 April 2020). 
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Figure 1 
 
In 2019, the number of conflict-induced IDPs increased to 45.7 million  
(see IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement 2020 [Geneva, April 2020], 2).  
The number of conflict-induced refugees in 2019 was not available at the time of publication. 
Source: IDMC 
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Indeed, there are relevant differences between 
conflict- and disaster-induced internal displacements. 
Extensive development projects go through a plan-
ning phase; the necessary relocations are therefore 
announced in advance. This allows for an orderly pro-
cess, and the state or the respective executing agency 
can make compensation payments or provide new 
accommodations. Nevertheless, resettlement can con-
stitute a form of displacement if it takes place under 
duress or if there is no adequate compensation. Like 
other types of internal displacement, this mostly 
affects poor and marginalised population groups who 
are not able to influence political decisions in their 
favour. This is the case, for example, when urban 
slums are cleared to make room for expensive new 
housing, or when indigenous populations are forced 
to leave their ancestral lands to allow for the exploi-
tation of mineral resources. In addition, particularly 
disadvantaged people often have no formal land titles 
or cannot refer to land registry entries and are there-
fore sometimes evicted from their accommodations 
without compensation. 
Organised Crime 
Under certain conditions, organised crime also leads 
to displacement.30 In some Latin American countries, 
such as Honduras and El Salvador, the number of 
violent crimes is so high, and the negative effects of 
gang crime so serious, that a substantial part of the 
population feels compelled to move.31 IDMC estimates 
that at least 432,000 people in the Northern Triangle 
of Central America were affected by this at the end 
of 2017.32 Often these are individuals or individual 
families, so the phenomenon is even less visible than 
 
30 The line between violent conflicts and organised 
crime is not always clear. In Colombia, for example, these 
two causes of displacement are intertwined. See Adriaan 
Aalsema, “Colombia Has Highest Number of Internally 
Displaced People”, Colombia Reports, 19 June 2018, https:// 
colombiareports.com/colombia-has-highest-number-of-
internally-displaced-people/ (accessed on 10 December 2019). 
31 David James Cantor, “The New Wave: Forced Displace-
ment Caused by Organized Crime in Central America and 
Mexico”, Refugee Survey Quarterly 33, no. 3 (2014): 34–68. 
32 See IDMC, “Understanding and Estimating Displacement 
in the Northern Triangle of Central America” (Geneva, 
September 2018), http://www.internal-displacement.org/ 
research-areas/criminal-violence (accessed 16 October 2019). 
Figure 3 
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other forms of displacement.33 This variant, too, 
usually affects poor population groups, which do 
not have the necessary resources to protect them-
selves from violent crimes, and it indicates that the 
state has not fulfilled its duty to protect its own 
citizens. 
The Role of International Actors 
Since internal displacement occurs predominantly in 
developing countries, the fact that wealthy states also 
actively contribute to the phenomenon is often over-
looked. Some of them finance dubious infrastructure 
and agricultural projects, fuel local conflicts, or send 
rejected asylum seekers or temporarily vulnerable 
persons back to places where they become internally 
displaced.34 The legal framework of the global refugee 
regime also has a direct impact on internal displace-
ment, as many countries apply the principle of 
the “internal flight alternative” in their asylum pro-
cedures: They only grant people access to international 
protection under the Geneva Convention if they can 
prove that they could not find safety elsewhere in 
their country of origin.35 In these instances, internal 
displacement is legally considered the preferred alter-
native to cross-border flight.36 
Structural Drivers and Protracted 
Internal Displacement 
When comparing the different scenarios in which 
internal displacement occurs, it becomes clear that – 
although the above-mentioned triggers are ultimately 
determinative for the relocation of individual per-
sons – pre-existing economic, social, or political dis-
advantages have a major influence on which popu-
lation groups are most affected. These structural 
 
33 IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement 2016 
(Geneva, May 2016), 45. 
34 IDMC, Mini Global Report on Internal Displacement 2017 
(Geneva, May 2017), 27f. 
35 See Elizabeth Ferris, “Internal Displacement and the 
Right to Seek Asylum”, Refugee Survey Quarterly 27, no. 3 
(2008): 76–92. 
36 See Chloe Sydney, “Internal Displacement Is Not 
an Acceptable Alternative to International Protection”, 
IDMC Expert Opinion, March 2020, https://www.internal-
displacement.org/expert-opinion/internal-displacement-is-
not-an-acceptable-alternative-to-international-protection 
(accessed 20 April 2020). 
drivers increase the risk of displacement in two ways. 
On the one hand, poor and marginalised population 
groups are more vulnerable to displacement for sev-
eral reasons: Members of such groups often settle in 
areas that are threatened by natural disasters or riven 
by organised crime. Furthermore, they often lack the 
reserves to bridge periods of scarcity caused by cli-
matic or economic factors. It also often happens that 
state authorities do not protect them from displace-
ment by private actors.37 On the other hand, they find 
it particularly difficult to overcome disadvantages 
resulting from their displacement. They are therefore 
disproportionally affected by protracted displacement 
(see text box). 
In contrast to temporary displacement, protracted 
internal displacement is not an inevitable consequence 
of conflicts or natural disasters, but – at least in part 
– the product of fundamental political failures and 
deficiencies. This weakens the previously introduced 
distinction between internal displacement that does 
involve and that which does not involve the partici-
pation of state actors. Since the primary responsibility 
for the protection of IDPs lies with the state author-
ities of their respective home country, protracted dis-
placement indicates that the state has failed in this 
respect, regardless of the original trigger of the dis-
placement. Therefore, the risk of protracted displace-
ment is particularly high in countries characterised 
by social inequality, ethnic tensions, and weak insti-
tutions. Often, as in Afghanistan and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, there are several large waves 
of displacement over the course of decades, which, 
although they have different triggers in individual 
cases, can jointly be attributed to a “permanent crisis 
of statehood”.38 Structural discrimination in these 
cases manifests in the lack of state support to over-
come the disadvantages suffered in the course of the 
original displacement. The extent of state support 
for IDPs often depends on how much political capital 
national authorities can draw from this commitment. 
People in geographically and politically remote parts 
of the country, as well as politically unpopular groups 
and ethnic minorities, often lose out. Besides state 
 
37 In Colombia, for example, women, children, and ethnic 
minorities make up a disproportionately large share of all 
IDPs; see James M. Shultz et al., “Fifteen Distinguishing 
Features”, Disaster Health 2, no. 1 (2014): 13–24 (13f.). 
38 Katy Long, Permanent Crises? Unlocking the Protracted Dis-
placement of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (Oxford: 
Refugee Studies Centre, October 2011). 
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weakness and the political neglect of affected popu-
lation groups, repression by authoritarian govern-
ments can also perpetuate internal displacement. For 
example, state actors sometimes prevent people who 
left their homes due to natural disasters from return-
ing, so that short-term, disaster-induced displacement 
is transformed into longer-term displacement per-
petuated by the state.39 
 
 
39 Ibid., 6. 
Protracted Displacement 
The term “protracted displacement”, introduced at the 
end of the 2000s, has fundamentally changed the political 
debate on internal displacement. The determining cri-
terion for describing a displacement as “protracted” is 
notits duration, but rather whether any progress towards 
durable solutions is discernible, or whether the situation 
is becoming engrained.
a
 This perspective also changes 
the assessment of humanitarian aid operations in cases 
of displacement by drawing attention to the deficits of an 
understanding of protection that is limited to “care and 
maintenance”. This narrow understanding of protection 
can lead to scenarios whereby those affected become per-
manently dependent on aid programmes and transfer 
payments.
b
 
a IDMC, IDPs in Protracted Displacement: Is Local Inte-
gration a Solution? Report from the Second Expert 
Seminar on Protracted Internal Displacement, 19–20 
January 2011 (Geneva, May 2011), 7. 
b Center on International Cooperation, Addressing 
Protracted Displacement: A Framework for Development-
Humanitarian Cooperation (New York, NY, December 
2015), 6f. 
Additional data requirements 
Total figures give a first impression of the extent of inter-
nal displacement. However, they have only limited prac-
tical use, since the support needs of those concerned vary 
according to the context. A more detailed assessment of 
the conditions in which IDPs live in the various countries 
and regions is needed in order to distribute the available 
resources sensibly and to develop appropriate recommen-
dations for action. This is where a recent IDMC initiative 
comes in that assesses the severity of displacement in dif-
ferent countries and regions in eight issue areas:
a
 (1) secu-
rity, (2) income opportunities, (3) housing, (4) basic public 
services, (5) access to documents, (6) family reunification, 
(7) political participation, and (8) access to the legal sys-
tem.
b
 This new frame of reference offers helpful starting 
points for the work of development actors in particular. 
However, the planning and implementation of the appro-
priate assistance requires further information, ideally 
in the form of disaggregated data that reflect the socio-
demographic structure of IDPs and their specific needs. 
This is time-consuming and costly, but it forms an im-
portant foundation for targeted programming. 
Since many affected governments are unwilling to 
deal with internal displacement, scientists are faced with 
a kind of chicken-and-egg problem when collecting data: 
Reliable data are necessary to make the problem visible 
and to bring it into the public domain. At the same time, 
however, the governments concerned would first have to 
acknowledge that there is internal displacement. As long 
as they deny this, they will not provide the financial and 
administrative resources necessary for data collection and 
analysis. 
a IDMC, Impact and Experience. Assessing Severity of Con-
flict Displacement. Methodological Paper (Geneva, February 
2019). 
b These sub-sectors meet the criteria of the Frame-
work on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced 
Persons developed by the Inter-Agency Standing Com-
mittee (IASC) of the United Nations (see the section 
on “Political and Legal Regulatory Approaches” in this 
paper, p. 22). 
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Large-scale displacement not only leads to high per-
sonal costs, but also to structural changes. Typical 
consequences include increased urbanisation, a shift 
in traditional power relations, and an exacerbation 
of social inequalities. Ethiopia and Pakistan are useful 
case studies for illustrating these different trends, 
since both countries have been affected by different 
forms of internal displacement for decades and have 
experienced far-reaching economic, political, and 
social impacts. 
Ethiopia’s history is marked by recurring waves 
of displacement. The politically motivated denial of 
internal displacement also has a long history. Both 
Haile Selassie’s regime and the subsequent Derg 
military regime in the 1970s and 1980s feared repu-
tational damage as a result of large-scale displace-
ment caused by mismanagement and famine. In the 
course of the economic upswing since the turn of the 
millennium, Ethiopia has embarked upon a number 
of large and prestigious infrastructure projects. In 
this context, the government resettled many citizens 
without taking into account the social costs of such 
measures. The routine denial of there having been 
expulsions – particularly those caused by conflict 
and development – was a permanent feature of 
Ethiopian politics until very recently. As a result, for 
a long time international actors were only able to 
provide very limited support to those affected.40 This 
changed when the new prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, 
took office in May 2018. The Ethiopian government 
now acknowledges the existence of conflict-induced 
internal displacement, it seeks support from aid orga-
 
40 See Mehari Taddele Maru, Causes, Dynamics, and Conse-
quences of Internal Displacement in Ethiopia, Global Issues Divi-
sion, Working Paper (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, May 2017). 
nisations, and it engages constructively in inter-
national discussions on improvements in this area.41 
The political opening in Ethiopia 
under Ahmed coincided with a rapid 
increase in new displacements. 
However, the political opening under Ahmed 
coincided with a rapid increase in new displacements. 
In addition to 296,000 displacements due to natural 
disasters such as droughts and floods, Ethiopia ex-
perienced 2,895,000 new conflict-induced displace-
ments in 2018, the highest number world-wide.42 The 
causes were mostly social and ethnic tensions that had 
existed for a long time and were kept under control 
by the previous authoritarian government; in the con-
text of the newly created political freedoms, these 
tensions have been increasingly unleashed in violent 
conflicts.43 Overcoming this problem is a monumen-
tal task for Ahmed’s government. The national Du-
rable Solutions Initiative for IDPs, launched in Decem-
ber 2019, is a step in the right direction, so long as it 
respects the freedom of choice of those affected and 
does not push them to return prematurely. 
Since Pakistan’s founding in 1947, migration and 
expulsion have shaped the country’s history. Between 
2010 and 2015 alone, around 1.5 million people had 
to leave their homes due to natural disasters – mainly 
 
41 Mark Yarnell, “Ethiopia: Abiy’s Misstep on IDPs and 
How He Can Fix It”, African Arguments (online), 24 October 
2018, https://africanarguments.org/2018/10/24/ethiopia-idps-
abiy-misstep-fix/ (accessed 14 October 2019). 
42 IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement 2019 
(see note 24). 
43 Human Rights Watch, “Ethiopia: Abiy’s First Year as 
Prime Minister. Review of Conflict and Internally Displaced 
Persons”, 9 April 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/ 
09/ethiopia-abiys-first-year-prime-minister-review-conflict-
and-internally-displaced (accessed 16 October 2019). 
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floods and earthquakes.44 Violent conflicts in the past 
have also regularly caused large waves of displace-
ment. The FATA region (Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas), a semi-autonomous region in north-west Paki-
stan until its merger with the neighbouring province 
of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018, was particularly 
affected. It is considered to be a place of origin and 
retreat for terrorist militias, which the Pakistani army 
has repeatedly attempted to combat with major mili-
tary offensives. During the Zarb-e-Azb offensive, 
which started in June 2014, more than 900,000 people 
were forced to leave their home regions within the 
first month.45 
State authorities support different groups of Paki-
stani IDPs to very different degrees. Since 2007, 
assistance to people who have been forced to leave 
their homes because of natural disasters has been co-
ordinated by a network of regional disaster manage-
ment authorities and is relatively well-organised. But 
there is no institution that takes care of those who 
have been displaced by conflict. In recent years, IDPs 
from the FATA region in particular have suffered 
from this deficit. In addition, the Pakistani govern-
ment, concerned for its reputation, was anxious to 
cover up the extent of the fighting and displacement 
in the region, and therefore did not launch a humani-
tarian appeal.46 
Reinforcement of Existing 
Urbanisation Trends 
Urbanisation is considered a megatrend of the 21st 
century.47 Displacement, both internal and cross-
 
44 See IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement 2016 
(see note 33), 26. In its annual reports, IDMC regularly em-
phasises that the data available for Pakistan on internal 
displacement is inadequate, since it only takes into account 
those affected in the former FATA region. 
45 Sohail Ahmad, Sadia Sohail and Muhammad Shoaib 
Malik, “Displacement from FATA Pakistan (2009–2016): 
Issues and Challenges”, Global Regional Review 1, no. 1 (2016): 
48–60 (50). 
46 “PM Has Given Clear Instructions Not To Seek External 
Assistance: FO”, The Express Tribune (online), 10 July 2014, 
https://tribune.com.pk/story/733684/pm-has-given-clear-
instructions-not-to-seek-external-assistance-fo/ (accessed 18 
February 2020). 
47 See United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2018 Revision (New 
York, NY, 2019), 1. 
border, is also increasingly becoming an urban phe-
nomenon.48 This puts a burden on the infrastructure 
of affected cities, poses security risks, and creates 
social challenges. In Pakistan – a country already 
marked by rapid urbanisation – many IDPs have 
moved to the cities in recent years due to family net-
works or in search of income opportunities.49 This is 
particularly true of Karachi, the economic centre of 
the country, as well as the provincial capital Pesha-
war, whose population almost doubled between 1998 
and 2013, from 1.7 to 3.3 million.50 In both cities, the 
already inadequate education and health care systems 
were not prepared for the high level of immigration; 
the water and energy supplies are equally inadequate. 
This competition for scarce resources leads to resent-
ment among the local population towards newcom-
ers, thereby fuelling social tensions. Thus, the com-
petition for housing is intensifying, and the poorest 
population groups are being pushed to the periphery 
of the cities. In addition, new security risks arise 
because the Taliban use Karachi as a place of retreat 
and to recruit new fighters. At the same time, IDPs 
from the FATA region are experiencing further dis-
advantages, as they are sometimes perceived as 
Taliban allies and are therefore subject to increased 
state controls. The consequences are restrictions on 
their freedom of movement and discrimination when 
looking for work.51 
In Ethiopia, where current calculations show that 
86.8 per cent of the population lives in rural areas, 
internal displacement and urbanisation are less 
strongly linked than in Pakistan. Nevertheless, IDPs 
 
48 Nadine Biehler and David Kipp, Alternatives to Refugee 
Camps. Cities Need International Support for Receiving Forcibly 
Displaced People, SWP Comment 49/2019 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, December 2019), 2; IDMC, Global 
Report on Internal Displacement 2019 (see note 24), 77. 
49 Michael Kugelman, Urbanisation in Pakistan: Causes and 
Consequences, NOREF Expert Analysis (Oslo: Norwegian Peace-
building Resource Centre [NOREF], January 2013), 2f.; IDMC, 
Pakistan: Solutions to Displacement Elusive for Both New and Pro-
tracted IDPs (Geneva, 24 August 2015), 7. 
50 Irina Mosel and Ashley Jackson, Sanctuary in the City? 
Urban Displacement and Vulnerability in Peshawar, Humanitarian 
Policy Group Working Paper (London: Overseas Development 
Institute [ODI], May 2013), 12. 
51 Gabriel Domínguez, “Pakistan’s Urbanization: ‘A Chal-
lenge of Great Proportions’”, interview with Michael Kugel-
man, Deutsche Welle (online), 30 December 2014, https://www. 
dw.com/en/pakistans-urbanization-a-challenge-of-great-
proportions/a-18163731 (accessed on 14 October 2019). 
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constitute an above-average proportion of the urban 
population: 21 per cent of those affected live in cities 
or peri-urban areas, compared with 13.2 per cent of 
the total population.52 In both countries considered 
here, internal displacement contributes to slum devel-
opment. In turn, the housing situation in slums often 
carries an increased risk of disaster-induced displace-
ment.53 
Increasing levels of urbanisation, however, not 
only bring disadvantages but also create opportuni-
ties. If IDPs are supported in their entrepreneurial 
endeavours, they too can make positive contribu-
tions. For example, they can strengthen trade rela-
tions within the country.54 Particularly in the case 
of protracted internal displacement, it is unlikely 
that displaced persons will return to rural areas. It is 
therefore important to recognise the long-term demo-
graphic changes resulting from internal displacement 
at an early stage and to take them into account in 
urban planning processes. This is the best means 
for meeting the challenges of displacement in urban 
areas.55 Support from international actors can be 
helpful here. It is beyond the competence of humani-
tarian actors to adapt complex urban systems to the 
demands of rapid immigration. The necessary expan-
sion of public services and material infrastructure can 
only succeed in close coordination with the respective 
city administration. It is therefore usually a task for 
development actors. 
Shifts in Established Power Relations 
Civil wars often result in the expulsion of minorities, 
sometimes, as in the Bosnian War, with the explicit 
aim of ethnic segregation. However, internal displace-
ment due to rampant, omnipresent violence or natu-
ral disasters also carries the risk, especially in multi-
ethnic societies, that the power relations which have 
been balanced over years and decades may be called 
into question, thus fuelling conflict.56 
 
52 International Organization for Migration (IOM), Internal 
Displacement in Urban and Rural Areas. An Analysis of IDP Distri-
bution and Access to Services in Nigeria and Ethiopia (Geneva, May 
2019), 11–13. 
53 IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement 2019 
(see note 24), 84f. 
54 Ibid., 91. 
55 Ibid., 101. 
56 Ethnic diversity is not per se a source of conflict, but 
conflict parties often mobilise their supporters along ethnic 
The federal system of Ethiopia has been organised 
along ethnic lines since 1991. Six of the nine federal 
states that make up the country as a whole, namely 
Afar, Amhara, Harar, Oromia, Somali, and Tigray, 
are each dominated by a different ethnic group. The 
remaining three are more ethnically mixed. Even 
though the central government, which was clearly 
authoritarian until the change of government in 2018, 
has great power, this federal structure allows for a 
certain degree of self-government and cultural 
autonomy. However, the federal system by no means 
fully reflects the diversity of Ethiopia’s multi-ethnic 
society. Moreover, the political participation levels of 
the groups that dominate the individual states are not 
equal, since some of them participate in the central 
government while others do not. The system as a 
whole is fragile because, among other things, migra-
tion movements within the country disturb the 
coherence of ethnically dominated regions. Border 
disputes and land conflicts regularly lead to inter-
nal displacement in Ethiopia. In 2018 and 2019, for 
example, there were violent clashes both within 
Oromia and Harar, on the borders between Oromia 
and Somali, and between Amhara and Tigray, as a 
result of which many people were displaced.57 The 
origins of some of these conflicts lie in previous state 
resettlement programmes, during the implementa-
tion of which traditional land rights were ignored.58 
Pakistan is also a federal state, but its political sys-
tem is less strictly organised along ethnic lines com-
pared to Ethiopia. Nevertheless, the displacement of 
population groups has brought about demographic 
changes in individual regions and thus has called 
existing power relations into question. This can be 
illustrated by the example of Karachi, Pakistan’s 
capital from the founding of the state in 1947 to 
1959, and today the country’s leading economic 
metropolis and the capital of Sindh province. As a 
result of the violent riots that accompanied the par-
 
lines, see inter alia James D. Fearon, “Ethnic Mobilization 
and Ethnic Violence”, in The Oxford Handbook of Political 
Economy, ed. Barry R. Weingast and Donald Wittman (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 852–68. 
57 Human Rights Watch, “Ethiopia: Abiy’s First Year as 
Prime Minister” (see note 43); IDMC, Global Report on Internal 
Displacement 2019 (see note 24), 14. 
58 See Markos Ezra, Ecological Degradation, Rural Poverty, 
and Migration in Ethiopia: A Contextual Analysis, Policy Research 
Division Working Paper no. 149 (New York, NY: Population 
Council, 2001); Maru, Causes, Dynamics, and Consequences of 
Internal Displacement in Ethiopia (see note 40), 7. 
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tition of India after independence from the British 
Empire, many Muslim refugees (the Mohajirs) from 
India settled in Karachi. Decades later, the Pakistani 
military government under Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq 
mobilised this group to create a counterweight to the 
Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), which had its stronghold 
in Sindh. This led to the founding of the Muttahida 
Qaumi Movement (MQM) in the mid-1980s, a politi-
cal party that initially fought for the rights of the 
Mohajirs and their descendants. The MQM proceeded 
to become an important opponent of the PPP in 
Karachi and in Sindh province. 
Due to its economic attractiveness, Karachi also 
became the largest Pashtun city outside the traditional 
Pashtun settlement areas in the north-west. From 
2007 onwards, the moderate Awami National Party 
(ANP) developed into the political mouthpiece of the 
Pashtun middle class in Karachi. The concern of the 
established parties about a further strengthening of 
the ANP resulted in prejudice against Pashtun IDPs 
seeking refuge in Karachi.59 Ultimately, however, the 
ANP did not succeed in becoming a decisive force in 
Karachi. One important reason for this was that their 
representatives were deliberately threatened by Tali-
ban supporters in the early 2010s and became victims 
of attacks.60 
Exacerbation of Societal Inequalities 
Displacement not only brings about new human 
rights violations. Often, long-standing patterns of 
disadvantage and marginalisation are perpetuated 
and reinforced. In Pakistan, IDPs from the former 
FATA region are discriminated against, for example 
when looking for work.61 They are also being urged 
 
59 Tayyab Ali Shah, “Fresh Violence Threatens to Make 
Karachi the New Mogadishu”, The Jamestown Foundation 
Terrorism Monitor (online), 4 February 2011, https://james 
town.org/program/fresh-violence-threatens-to-make-karachi-
the-new-mogadishu/; “ANP Critical of Government Decision 
to Stop IDPs from Entering Karachi”, AAJ News (online), 24 
May 2009, http://www.aaj.tv/english/national/anp-critical-of-
government-decision-to-stop-idps-from-entering-karachi/ 
(accessed 19 February 2020). 
60 Sartaj Khan, “Karachi’s Great Middle Class Pashtun 
Hope”, The Friday Times (online), 6 October 2017, https://www. 
thefridaytimes.com/karachis-great-middle-class-pashtun-
hope/ (accessed 19 February 2020). 
61 Waqqas Mir, “State Authorities Fail Citizens”, Develop-
ment and Cooperation (online), 4 February 2016, https://www. 
to return to areas that are no longer officially clas-
sified as conflict areas, but in which water and elec-
tricity supplies, as well as access to education and 
health, are still not guaranteed.62 However, there are 
other forms of structural disadvantage. For example, 
people who had lost their homes due to the major 
floods in 2010 had to present a machine-readable 
identity card in order to receive financial support. 
Yet, since most Pakistani women are not registered 
under their own names but only as family members 
of a male relative, it was particularly difficult for 
single or widowed women to access these support 
services.63 Another disadvantaged group of IDPs 
were agricultural workers, who were quasi-feudally 
dependent on landowners and also had to leave their 
homes because of the floods. Some of the poorest 
among them reportedly did not return to their homes, 
fearing that they themselves would have to pay for 
the costs of the crop failure, and thus fall into debt 
bondage.64 
In Ethiopia, on the other hand, poor population 
groups are especially affected by government resettle-
ment programmes. In the course of the modernisa-
tion and expansion of the capital, slum dwellers and 
the rural population from the immediate vicinity of 
Addis Ababa in particular are being resettled. Many 
of those affected lose access to sources of income.65 It 
also happens time and again that state resettlement 
programmes violate the rights of host communities. 
Pastoralists, that is, shepherds who practise extensive 
natural grazing, are particularly affected by this. 
Since their land rights are often not formally docu-
mented, the areas they use are considered potential 
 
dandc.eu/en/article/pakistan-violates-rights-internally-
displaced-people (accessed 18 February 2020). 
62 Zulfiqar Ali, “IDPs Unwilling to Return Will Be Deregis-
tered”, Dawn (online), 6 January 2017, https://reliefweb.int/ 
report/pakistan/idps-unwilling-return-will-be-deregistered 
(accessed 14 December 2019). 
63 Alice Thomas, “Rising Waters, Broken Lives. Experience 
from Pakistan and Colombia Floods Suggests New Approach-
es Are Needed”, in Humanitarian Crises and Migration. Causes, 
Consequences and Responses, ed. Susan F. Martin, Sanjula 
Weerasinghe and Abbie Taylor (London and New York, NY: 
Routledge, 2014), 53–76. 
64 IDMC, Pakistan: Displacement Caused by Conflict and Natural 
Disasters, Achievements and Challenges (Geneva, 10 January 
2012), 7. 
65 Maru, Causes, Dynamics, and Consequences of Internal Dis-
placement in Ethiopia (see note 40), 21. 
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settlement areas, and they are resettled without prior 
consultation.66 
A recent concerning development under the lead-
ership of Prime Minister Ahmed is the state-organised 
repatriation of people who have only recently fled 
violent conflicts in their home areas. Such repatria-
tions to areas that are sometimes still unsafe are not 
carried out under physical duress. In some cases, 
however, they are a prerequisite for access to food aid 
and other support services. For this reason, those who 
are particularly dependent on support have no choice 
but to accept the risks of return.67 
 
66 Ibid., 27f. 
67 Refugees International, Statement: Ethiopia’s Treatment 
of Its Own IDPs Making Crisis Worse (online), (Washington, 
D.C., 18 May 2019), https://www.refugeesinternational.org/ 
reports/2019/5/17/ethiopias-treatment-of-its-own-idps-
making-crisis-worse (accessed 14 October 2019). 
Durable solutions are only possible 
if disadvantages caused by 
displacement are eliminated. 
The comparison of two very different country 
contexts – Ethiopia and Pakistan – illustrates the 
longer-term challenges arising from internal displace-
ment. State actors who shy away from structural 
change often try to restore the status quo that existed 
before the displacement. Hence they press for a quick 
return of the affected people to their homes. If, how-
ever, the circumstances for a safe return are not 
assured, or if the persons concerned have other pref-
erences, this approach perpetuates the disadvantage 
suffered in the context of the initial displacement. For 
durable solutions, it is essential that disadvantages 
caused by displacement are eliminated. It should not 
matter whether people settle where they are, return 
to their home towns, or settle elsewhere. Such solu-
tions are challenging and require that the respective 
state shows a high degree of willingness as well as 
an ability to act – international actors can help to 
strengthen both. These efforts are based on the stand-
ards and regulatory approaches to internal displace-
ment that have been developed over the past three 
decades. 
Advantages and disadvantages of 
registration 
IDPs are often considered “statistically invisible” because 
they live scattered within host communities or with rela-
tives and are not easily discernible in everyday life. As a 
result, the full extent of the need for support sometimes 
goes unrecognised or is denied by state authorities. In 
order to provide targeted assistance to IDPs, they must 
generally register with local or national authorities. Apart 
from purely practical challenges – similar to those in-
volved in the registration of cross-border refugees – an 
additional problem arises here: An official status as an 
IDP may have the effect of singling them out from other 
nationals not affected by displacement. This can have 
negative consequences. On the one hand, the “visibility” 
generated by official registration can be dangerous, espe-
cially for persecuted minorities, for example if it results 
in physical attacks or triggers targeted discrimination. On 
the other hand, there is a danger that state actors will use 
registration as a pretext for shifting the responsibility for 
the protection and care of the persons concerned to aid 
organisations and will no longer fulfil their obligations 
towards their own nationals. This issue demands a high 
degree of political caution and sensitivity from inter-
national actors. Not only should a responsible and data-
protection-compliant approach to personal data be guar-
anteed. Above all, registration should never be an end in 
itself, but should be made dependent on whether it is 
beneficial or detrimental to the overall situation of IDPs. 
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In contrast to the global refugee regime that is en-
shrined in the Geneva Convention and institutionally 
consolidated by the existence of UNHCR, the rights 
of IDPs are secured neither institutionally nor under 
international law. Nevertheless, important legal ad-
vancements have been made in the last three decades 
that strengthen the rights of IDPs and identify pos-
sible solutions. In addition to the UN Guiding Prin-
ciples on Internal Displacement, there are also points 
of reference at the regional level, in particular con-
cerning the protection of IDPs and the provision of 
development-oriented support. At the national level, 
more and more legal protection instruments have 
also been created. 
Internal Displacement on the 
International Agenda 
When assessing international developments pertain-
ing to internal displacement over time, it is useful 
to distinguish between normative (binding and non-
binding under international law), institutional, and 
discursive developments. The timeline in Figure 4 
provides an overview of the first two areas. 
International Legal Foundations 
In 1992, the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted 
its first resolution on IDPs, in which it called, inter 
alia, for the appointment of a UN Special Representa-
tive for IDPs.68 The first incumbent was former Suda-
 
68 See UN Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 
E/CN.4/RES/1992/73, 5 March 1992 https://www.refworld.org/ 
docid/3b00f0e71c.html (accessed on 10 February 2020). 
Subsequently, the UN Commission on Human Rights 
adopted an annual resolution on internal displacement, 
and from 1994 onwards, the UN General Assembly adopted 
resolutions every two years. The UN Human Rights Council, 
nese Foreign Minister Francis Deng. The urgency of 
his task was underlined by the upheavals of the Bos-
nian War. The existence of a large group of IDPs 
within a European state – and the concern of West-
ern European states that these people might cross the 
border – brought the issue of internal displacement 
to the attention of the international community. 
Deng used this window of opportunity to strengthen 
the rights of IDPs. In 1998, he presented the UN Guid-
ing Principles on Internal Displacement to the UN 
Commission on Human Rights, which were developed 
under his aegis. 
The Guiding Principles became the 
main point of reference for the 
protection of IDPs. 
These Guiding Principles subsequently became 
the central reference point for the protection of IDPs 
under international law.69 They do not contain any 
new legal norms, but delineate how existing prin-
ciples of international law and humanitarian law can 
be applied in the context of internal displacement. 
They are structured according to the different phases 
 
which replaced the UN Commission on Human Rights in 
2006, continues to adopt a new resolution on internal dis-
placement every two to three years. An overview of the 
resolutions can be found at the Office of the High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Resolutions of the Human 
Rights Council, Previous Commission on Human Rights, and the 
General Assembly on Internally Displaced Persons, https://www. 
ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IDPersons/Pages/Resolutions.aspx 
(accessed 16 October 2019). 
69 See inter alia the reaffirmation of the guidelines by 
resolutions of the UN General Assembly and Human Rights 
Council: UN General Assembly, Resolution A/RES/66/165, 
22 March 2012, https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/66/165 (accessed 
10 February 2020); UN Human Rights Council, Resolution 
A/HRC/RES/23/8, 20 June 2013, https://undocs.org/en/A/ 
HRC/RES/23/8 (accessed 10 February 2020). 
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of displacement. Section II is devoted to protection 
against displacement, Section III to protection during 
displacement, and Section V to return, resettlement, 
and reintegration. These are supplemented by general 
guidelines (Section I) and guidelines on humanitarian 
aid (Section IV). The primary responsibility of national 
authorities is a recurrent theme throughout the 
Guiding Principles.70 
One of Deng’s main concerns was to overcome the 
contradictions between national sovereignty and an 
international responsibility to stand up for those in 
need of protection. Under the slogan “sovereignty as 
responsibility”, he advocated a sophisticated under-
standing of state sovereignty that does not hold legal 
self-determination to be absolute, but emphasises 
that it goes hand in hand with the responsibility of a 
state towards its own population.71 This understand-
ing is taken up in the Guiding Principles, which stipu-
late that offers by international humanitarian organi-
sations and other appropriate actors that can assist 
IDPs must not be arbitrarily rejected – “especially if 
the competent authorities are unable or unwilling 
to provide the necessary humanitarian assistance”.72 
Deng thus created the concept of a state’s responsibil-
ity to protect, the non-fulfilment of which cannot be 
passively accepted, but rather must be compensated 
by the international community. He was thus one 
of the pioneers of the norm “Responsibility to Pro-
tect” (R2P), which was established at the UN level in 
the early 2000s, legitimising humanitarian interven-
tions.73 
With the publication of the Guiding Principles, the 
cornerstones of an international responsibility to pro-
tect IDPs were established. Over the next few years, 
further international and regional standards and legal 
instruments were developed. These include the Prin-
 
70 See United Nations, Guidelines on Internal Displacement 
(see note 1). 
71 See Francis M. Deng, “Frontiers of Sovereignty: A Frame-
work of Protection, Assistance, and Development for the In-
ternally Displaced”, Leiden Journal of International Law 8, no. 2 
(1995): 249–86. 
72 United Nations, Guidelines on Internal Displacement 
(see note 1), 11. 
73 Francis M. Deng, “From ‘Sovereignty as Responsibility’ 
to the ‘Responsibility to Protect’”, Global Responsibility to Protect 
2, no. 4 (2010): 353–70. Both the IDP guidelines and the R2P 
concept were confirmed by the UN General Assembly in a 
resolution at the 2005 World Humanitarian Summit; see 
UN General Assembly, Resolution A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005, 
https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/60/1 (accessed 10 February 2020). 
ciples on Housing and Property Restitution for 
Refugees and Displaced Persons, also known as the 
Pinheiro Principles, adopted in 2005. They provide 
refugees and IDPs with the same legal security and 
access to housing and land as other citizens.74 In 
the African context, two agreements were concluded 
at the regional level that, to date, remain the only 
legally binding instruments of protection for IDPs 
under international law. The first is the Protocol on 
the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced 
Persons of the International Conference on the Great 
Lakes Region (ICGLR), adopted in 2006, which makes 
the Guiding Principles binding for the 10 member 
states of the ICGLR. The second is the African Union 
Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Inter-
nally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Conven-
tion) of 2009. 
The Kampala Convention, in particular, points the 
way forward in several respects. First of all, it is the 
only legally binding instrument at the regional level 
to date that not only affirms the rights of IDPs but 
also spells out the resulting obligations for state 
actors. In addition, the Kampala Convention expands 
the possibilities for international engagement by 
authorising the African Union to intervene in mem-
ber states if necessary and to help create durable 
solutions for IDPs. After Swaziland became the 15th 
African state to ratify the Kampala Convention, it 
entered into force in 2012. In the meantime, 31 states 
have acceded.75 A number of others have publicly 
expressed their willingness to do so soon.76 
The end of internal displacement is 
not a one-off event, but a process. 
At the UN level, it was Walter Kälin who promoted 
the implementation of the Guiding Principles in the 
national context. In 2004, he took over the UN office 
of Special Representative from Francis Deng, but with 
 
74 See Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, The Pinheiro 
Principles. United Nations Principles on Housing and Property Resti-
tution for Refugees and Displaced Persons (Geneva, 2005), https:// 
www.humanitarianlibrary.org/sites/default/files/2014/07/9977
4.pdf (accessed 20 December 2019). 
75 See UNHCR, “UNHCR Welcomes Ethiopia’s Ratification 
of Kampala Convention”, UNHCR Press Release, 14 February 
2020, https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2020/2/5e468f7d4/ 
unhcr-welcomes-ethiopias-ratification-kampala-convention. 
html (accessed 11 March 2020). 
76 ICRC, The Kampala Convention: Key Recommendations Ten 
Years On (Geneva, December 2019), 18. 
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a new title that now entailed a focus on human rights 
(UN Special Representative for the Human Rights of 
Internally Displaced Persons).77 During Kälin’s term 
of office, the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
(IASC) developed a key document that was to shape 
discussions on internal displacement for years to 
come: The Framework on Durable Solutions for Inter-
nally Displaced Persons for the first time defined the 
end of internal displacement not as a one-off event, 
but as a process, in the course of which the special 
needs of those affected are gradually reduced.78 
Since the mid-2010s, some contradictory develop-
ments have taken place. On the one hand, internal 
displacement is increasingly being taken into account 
in important development and humanitarian pro-
cesses. For example, the SDGs, which were adopted 
in 2015, list IDPs as a vulnerable group. The Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, 
adopted the same year, contains recommendations on 
how to prevent or manage disaster-induced displace-
ment. The core commitments agreed at the World 
Humanitarian Summit 2016 include the ambitious 
goal of halving the number of IDPs by 2030.79 In addi-
tion, the New Urban Agenda of 2017 recognises the 
particular challenges faced by IDPs in urban areas.80 
On the other hand, the topic is consistently omitted 
in key refugee and migration-related processes. Where-
as in 2015 and 2016 cross-border migratory move-
ments moved to the top of the international agenda 
in the context of large-scale immigration to Europe, 
 
77 See The Brookings Institution and University of Bern, 
Addressing Internal Displacement: A Framework for National 
Responsibility (Washington, D.C., and Bern, April 2005). 
78 See Walter Kälin, Report of the Representative of the Secre-
tary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, 
A/65/282, 11 August 2010; UN Human Rights Council, Frame-
work on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, A/HRC/ 
13/21/Add.4, 9 February 2010, https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/ 
13/21/Add.4 (accessed 10 February 2020). 
79 See UN General Assembly, Transforming Our World: The 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Resolution A/RES/70/1, 
21 October 2015, https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/70/1 (accessed 
10 February 2020); United Nations, New Urban Agenda, http:// 
habitat3.org/wp-content/uploads/NUA-English.pdf (accessed 
10 February 2020). 
80 See Leave No One Behind: A Commitment to Address Forced 
Displacement, High-Level Leaders’ Roundtable, Core Responsi-
bility Three of the Agenda for Humanity, World Humanitar-
ian Summit, Istanbul, 23–24 May 2016, https://www.agenda 
forhumanity.org/sites/default/files/resources/2017/Jul/LEAVE_ 
NO_ONE_BEHIND-A_COMMITMENT_TO_ADDRESS_FORCED_ 
DISPLACEMENT.pdf (accessed 16 October 2019). 
the issue of internal displacement has not received 
the same attention, despite steadily increasing num-
bers.81 In the New York Declaration for Refugees and 
Migrants of 2016, IDPs are only mentioned in the 
introduction, and neither the Global Refugee Com-
pact nor the Global Migration Compact, adopted 
at the UN level in December 2018, takes IDPs into 
account.82 This has serious consequences, for example 
in the distribution of funds earmarked for the imple-
mentation of the two compacts. 
Institutional Developments and 
Responsibilities 
From the beginning, institutional responsibilities for 
IDPs were fragmented. In the event of severe crises, 
they were distributed ad hoc to those humanitarian 
actors who were on the ground. The deficiencies of 
this system were known early on. As early as 1988, 
the UN General Assembly called for more effective 
coordination of humanitarian aid for IDPs. Since 
1990, UN Resident Coordinators have taken on these 
institutional responsibilities, but significant short-
comings remain.83 
In 1998, IDMC, financed by the Norwegian Refugee 
Council, was established. The work of this organisa-
tion improved the quality and availability of the data 
on IDPs and paved the way for a first stocktaking of 
the situation of IDPs world-wide. Two major UN pub-
lications in 2004 and 2005 came to the unanimous 
conclusion that the existing system could not ensure 
 
81 Steffen Angenendt and Anne Koch, “Die internationale 
Zusammenarbeit in der Flüchtlings- und Migrationspolitik – 
fragmentierte Teilordnungen unter Veränderungsdruck”, in 
Auflösung oder Ablösung? Die internationale Ordnung im Umbruch, 
ed. Hanns W. Maull, SWP Studie 21/2017 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, December 2017), 73–89 (81). 
82 See UN General Assembly, New York Declaration on 
Refugees and Migrants, A/RES/71/1, 3 October 2016, https:// 
www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/ 
generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_71_1.pdf 
(accessed 10 February 2020); United Nations, Global Compact 
on Refugees (New York, NY, 2018), https://www.unhcr.org/ 
5c658aed4 (accessed 10 February 2020); UN General Assem-
bly, Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, 
A/RES/73/195, 11 January 2019, https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/ 
73/195 (accessed 10 February 2020). 
83 Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng, Masses in Flight. The 
Global Crisis of Internal Displacement (Washington D.C.: Brook-
ings Institution Press, 1998), 127. 
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the protection of IDPs.84 The findings of these reports 
were an important driving force behind the UN 
humanitarian reform process completed in 2005, as 
well as the structural reforms within individual aid 
organisations.85 Since then, UNHCR, as head of the 
Global Protection Cluster, has had primary respon-
sibility for the protection of conflict-induced IDPs 
and shares the leadership of the Camp Coordination 
and Camp Management cluster with the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM).86 Furthermore, 
OCHA and UNHCR set up organisational units spe-
cifically focussed on IDPs, and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) developed, for the 
first time, an official position on the consideration 
of IDPs in its work. Within the United Nations Devel-
opment Programme (UNDP), the Bureau for Crisis 
Prevention and Recovery was given responsibility 
for internal displacement. In addition, the Joint IDP 
Profiling Service (JIPS) was established in 2009. As a 
service provider, it offers to collect socio-demographic 
data on individual groups affected by internal dis-
placement, thus facilitating targeted support. With 
the founding of the Global Program on Forced Dis-
placement in the same year, displacement-related 
issues were put on the World Bank’s agenda, but 
without an explicit focus on internal displacement. 
These institutional advances were thwarted by set-
backs in other areas or were not sustainable. In 2010, 
the office of the UN Special Representative for the 
Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons was 
replaced by that of a UN Special Rapporteur on the 
same issue. Although the change of mandate was 
presented to the outside world as a purely technical 
reform, it did in fact mean a downgrading of the 
office. Since then, it no longer entails official employ-
ment with the UN, but is fulfilled by a private indi-
 
84 See Simon Bagshaw and Diane Paul, Protect or Neglect? 
Toward a More Effective United Nations Approach to the Protection 
of Internally Displaced Persons (Washington, D.C., and New York, 
NY: The Brookings Institution and OCHA, November 2004); 
Costanza Adinolfi et al., Humanitarian Response Review (New 
York, NY, and Geneva: United Nations, August 2005), vi, 16. 
85 Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, Ten 
Years after Humanitarian Reform: How Are IDPs Faring? A Sum-
mary (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, December 
2014), 1. 
86 Deng’s proposal to give UNHCR a general mandate to 
protect IDPs was not successful; see Thomas G. Weiss and 
David A. Korn, Internal Displacement. Conceptualization and Its 
Consequences (London and New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), 
82f. 
vidual without remuneration.87 The already poorly 
equipped position has only minimal travel funds. 
This complicates one of the role’s core tasks – official 
country visits – and makes the respective office-
holders dependent on additional support from indi-
vidual donor countries. At the same time, a number 
of humanitarian organisations, in particular OCHA, 
UNHCR, and the ICRC, reduced the size of their orga-
nisational units dealing with internal displacement 
or disbanded them altogether in the early 2010s, ref-
erencing the successful mainstreaming of the issue. 
Finally, UN actors have been urged by their donors to 
focus on their core mandates in the face of an increas-
ing number of major crises and the resulting growing 
funding gaps, that is, in the case of UNHCR, on the 
protection of cross-border refugees.88 
A few years later, the fact that IDPs were not men-
tioned in the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees 
and Migrants prompted these same actors to reposi-
tion themselves on the issue. UNHCR, in particular, 
took a self-critical look at its previous role in the con-
text of internal displacement during an operational 
review process in 2017. In the report that concluded 
this review, the organisation committed to giving 
greater priority to IDPs and formulated the goal of 
systematically raising money for cases of protracted 
internal displacement.89 
In order to meet the complex challenges posed 
by internal displacement, much more flexible and 
longer-term financial resources are needed than are 
currently available. A reform of international financ-
ing structures would be in line with both the goals 
formulated in the “New Way of Working” and the 
recommendation on the Humanitarian–Develop-
ment–Peace Nexus (the so-called Triple Nexus) 
adopted by the Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development (OECD) Development Assis-
tance Committee in February 2019.90 Due to existing 
 
87 Elizabeth Ferris, Ten Years after Humanitarian Reform: 
How Have IDPs Fared? (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institu-
tion, December 2014), 40. 
88 Ibid., 40–43. 
89 See UNHCR, Operational Review of UNHCR’s Engagement 
in Situations of Internal Displacement (Geneva, September 2017); 
Kälin and Chapuisat, Breaking the Impasse (see note 10); IOM, 
Framework for Addressing Internal Displacement (Geneva, 2017). 
90 See OCHA, New Way of Working (Geneva, 2017), https:// 
www.agendaforhumanity.org/sites/default/files/20170228%20
NWoW%2013%20high%20res.pdf, and OECD, DAC Recom-
mendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus (Paris, 
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organisational logics and competition between dif-
ferent actors, however, the level of implementation 
of these reform proposals has been slow. Never-
theless, promising progress has been made in some 
areas. New flexible financial instruments have been 
developed in recent years to support countries host-
ing large numbers of cross-border refugees. These are 
the Global Concessional Financing Facility and the 
Regional Sub-window for Refugees and Host Commu-
nities, which was introduced in the 18th budget 
period of the International Development Association 
(IDA).91 Comparable instruments for cases of short-
term or protracted internal displacement, on the 
other hand, are lacking and are not planned for 
the coming IDA budget period. 
To mark the 20th anniversary of the UN Guiding 
Principles on Internally Displaced Persons in 2018, 
UNHCR, OCHA, and the Special Rapporteur on the 
Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons 
launched a new initiative, the GP20 Plan of Action.92 
This three-year action plan follows a multi-stake-
holder approach and has proved to be an important 
catalyst for intergovernmental learning.93 In parallel, 
IDMC and IOM established an informal dialogue for-
mat so that Geneva-based ambassadors of countries 
directly affected by internal displacement can ex-
change information. The representatives of the 18 
countries involved so far have greatly appreciated 
the confidential framework and the depth of the dis-
cussions. Participation in the dialogue format can be 
seen as an indicator that the respective governments 
are open to dealing with the issue of internal dis-
placement in a transparent and constructive manner. 
Furthermore, a common understanding of the prob-
 
2019), https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/public/doc/643/ 
643.en.pdf (accessed 2 December 2019). 
91 Steffen Angenendt, Nadine Biehler, David Kipp and 
Amrei Meier, Growing Needs, Insufficient Resources? How to Fund 
International Refugee Protection? SWP Research Paper 13/2019 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2019), 
18f. 
92 GP20 stands for 20 years Guiding Principles; see 20th 
Anniversary of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: 
A Plan of Action for Advancing Prevention, Protection and Solutions 
for Internally Displaced People 2018–2020, 23 May 2018, 4, 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2018052
3-gp20-plan-of-action-final.pdf (accessed 10 February 2020). 
93 Interviews with representatives of UNHCR, IOM, OCHA 
and IDMC, April and May 2019. 
lem is growing, which focusses on protracted internal 
displacement and the search for durable solutions.94 
A further initiative was launched in the anniver-
sary year of 2018. In a letter initiated by Norway 
and Switzerland, 37 states (including the 28 member 
states of the European Union, but also Afghanistan, 
Argentina, Georgia, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, and Zambia) 
called on the UN Secretary-General to establish a 
High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement in order to 
raise international awareness of the issue and develop 
new approaches.95 As the circle of support continued 
to grow, the UN Secretary-General decided to establish 
such a panel and entrusted UNHCR, IOM, and OCHA 
with the task of jointly designing and preparing it. 
The eight-member panel started its work in January 
2020 and is expected to present a final report with 
recommendations after one year. It comprises govern-
ment representatives, civil society, and private-sector 
actors, as well as representatives of international 
organisations, and it is supported by a secretariat 
in Geneva and a four-member advisory group. The 
members of the panel come from Afghanistan, Ethio-
pia, Italy, Jordan, Colombia, Norway, Rwanda, and 
South Sudan. Most of these countries are strongly 
affected by internal displacement.96 
This configuration gives reason to hope that the 
process will not be limited to navel-gazing (whereby 
only internal UN coordination problems are dis-
cussed), but instead address the pressing question of 
how affected states’ willingness to act can be strength-
ened. However, in the context of the corona pandem-
ic, the field visits and consultations that were meant 
to inform the panel’s work are unlikely to happen, 
and can only partially be compensated through on-
line meetings. Since no genuine development actor 
was involved in assembling the panel, it will also be 
a core task of the newly established secretariat to 
ensure the engagement of organisations such as 
UNDP and the World Bank in the ongoing process. 
 
94 Interviews with representatives of IDMC and IOM, 
May 2019. 
95 Letter was tweeted by NorwayUN on 26 July 2018, see 
https://twitter.com/norwayun/status/1022511054121775104? 
lang=de (accessed 16 October 2019). 
96 See United Nations, “Secretary-General Appoints 
Members of High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement”, 
Press Release (New York, 3 December 2019), https://www.un. 
org/press/en/2019/sga1930.doc.htm (accessed 9 December 
2019). 
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Discursive Change 
When the United States Committee for Refugees and 
Immigrants first collected figures on internal displace-
ment in the mid-1980s, it was considered a purely 
humanitarian problem that primarily required better 
coordination of existing assistance.97 Francis Deng, 
the first UN Special Representative for IDPs, empha-
sised the individual rights of the persons concerned 
during his term of office, thus adding a human rights 
dimension to the discourse. Since 1998, this has also 
been reflected in the resolutions of the UN General 
Assembly dealing with internal displacement.98 
A major achievement is that IDPs are 
mentioned as a vulnerable group in 
the Sustainable Development Goals. 
In the years that followed, the implementation 
of the Guiding Principles in national law was a focal 
point of the international commitment to address the 
issue of internal displacement. The search for reasons 
for the continuing increase in numbers, despite pro-
gress in legislation, shifted attention to the preva-
lence of long-term displacement. Starting in 2009, 
numerous publications on the phenomenon appeared, 
which jointly established the term “protracted dis-
placement” in the public discourse.99 This new focus 
has again found its way into the political discourse: 
In its resolution on internal displacement in 2014, 
the UN General Assembly took up the concept and 
added a development dimension to the humanitarian 
and human rights perspective enshrined in previous 
resolutions.100 The UN actors and non-governmental 
 
97 Cohen and Deng, Masses in Flight. The Global Crisis of 
Internal Displacement (see note 83), 32. 
98 See UN General Assembly, Resolution A/RES/52/130, 26 
February 1998, https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/52/130 (accessed 
11 February 2020), and all subsequent General Assembly 
resolutions on internal displacement. 
99 See, e.g., the contributions in Forced Migration Review 
33 (2009), https://www.fmreview.org/protracted, and IDMC, 
Protracted Internal Displacement in Europe. Current Trends and 
Ways Forward (Geneva, May 2009), also Katy Long, Permanent 
Crises? Unlocking the Protracted Displacement of Refugees and In-
ternally Displaced Persons (Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, 
October 2011). 
100 UN General Assembly, Resolution A/RES/68/180, 30 Janu-
ary 2014, 1f., https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/68/180 (accessed 10 
February 2020). This resolution also mentions peacebuilding 
as a possible additional dimension for the first time; another 
organisations concerned with internal displacement 
took up this change in perspective and advocated that 
internal displacement be taken into account in the 
context of international development policy process-
es. In this context, it is a major achievement that IDPs 
are mentioned as a vulnerable group in the SDGs. 
At the same time, a consensus has emerged between 
OCHA, UNHCR, and IOM that immediate emergency 
care for displaced persons is not enough, but that 
the strategies and work programmes of humanitarian 
actors must from the outset address the entire “dis-
placement continuum”, from prevention to durable 
solutions. In recent position papers, all three organi-
sations acknowledge the need for early cooperation 
with a wide range of local actors, and for capacity-
building and representation of IDPs, both at the 
national level and within specialised ministries and 
local governments. Overall, the repositioning is char-
acterised by a more development-oriented view of the 
issue of internal displacement than was the case just 
a few years ago.101 
In the course of the last three decades, there has 
been a shift in the perception of, and the discourse 
on, internal displacement. As a result, it is no longer 
seen as a purely humanitarian problem, but instead 
as a multidimensional task that includes humanitar-
ian, human rights, and development elements. This 
broadening of perspectives has been accompanied by 
the fact that more and more international actors are 
becoming conceptually or operationally involved in 
the field of internal displacement. 
As they interact, these actors are forming a global 
regime of internal displacement that is slowly grow-
ing more solid. With the exception of IOM, which is 
active both in humanitarian and development policy, 
each actor involved is firmly rooted in one of the 
three dimensions. This results in an “empty middle” 
in institutional terms. The new IDP regime, whose 
norms and standards are currently being developed, 
lacks an actor who would serve as a central political 
advocate for IDPs. Experts on IDPs agree that such a 
position is necessary to achieve real improvements in 
 
resolution adds reconciliation work (transitional justice), see 
Resolution A/RES/72/182, 19 January 2018, https://undocs.org/ 
en/A/RES/72/182 (accessed 10 February 2020). 
101 See UNHCR, Operational Review of UNHCR’s Engagement 
(see note 89); Kälin and Chapuisat, Breaking the Impasse (see 
note 10); IOM, Framework for Addressing Internal Displacement 
(see note 89). 
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protection and support for IDPs.102 It would therefore 
make sense to reintroduce the post of a Special Repre-
sentative for IDPs who reports directly to the UN Sec-
retary-General and deals with the issue in all its 
dimensions. In the spirit of the Triple Nexus, greater 
attention should also be paid to the peace-building 
dimension of internal displacement, and the relevant 
actors should be involved systematically and at an 
early stage in the debates on internal displacement. 
National Protection Instruments 
Since the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displace-
ment are not binding under international law, they 
 
102 Interviews with representatives of UNHCR, OCHA, 
the ICRC, IOM, IDMC and OHCHR, April and May 2019. 
only take effect if they are integrated into national 
legal systems. The fact that this is increasingly the 
case speaks for their now consolidated and growing 
importance.103 The transposition of the Guiding 
Principles into national law can take different forms. 
It can either result in national legislation or be re-
flected in policy instruments and action plans based 
on the Guiding Principles. 
 
103 Ileana Nicolau and Anaïs Pagot, “Laws and Policies on 
Internal Displacement: Global Adoption and Gaps”, Forced 
Migration Review 59 (2018): 9–10. 
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Laws alone are not enough when 
resources are scarce or a country’s 
legal system is overloaded. 
A legal basis is important to make state authorities 
accountable and to make the rights of IDPs enforce-
able. However, legislative procedures are usually cum-
bersome and lengthy, and laws alone are not suf-
ficient when resources are lacking or when a coun-
try’s legal system is fundamentally overloaded or 
otherwise not functioning. Policy instruments such 
as ministerial decisions, ordinances, or action plans 
can be adopted more quickly, and this facilitates the 
application of general legal regulations in concrete 
cases of displacement. To date, the protection of IDPs 
has been enshrined in law in 13 countries, and rele-
vant policy instruments exist in 35 countries.104 Inter-
national actors’ ability to make a difference has been 
inconsistent: On the one hand, progressive national 
legal instruments have emerged under their guid-
ance, while on the other hand, they have had little 
influence on the implementation of corresponding 
provisions.105 More important are often the positions 
of sub-national actors. In Afghanistan, for example, 
the implementation of the Afghan National Policy on 
Internal Displacement, adopted in 2013, is failing due 
to unresolved land conflicts because of resistance at 
the regional and local levels.106 In contrast, the efforts 
to establish a national protection instrument in Ethio-
pia were largely motivated by a previous initiative at 
the regional level.107 
Given the difficulties in applying displacement-
specific legal and policy instruments, other formats 
are worth exploring. Depending on the context, a 
sectoral approach that systematically takes into 
account the needs of IDPs in different policy areas 
may be a more effective form of protection. An 
example of this would be to include school access 
 
104 See Global Protection Cluster, Global Database on IDP 
Laws and Policies, http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/ 
global-database-on-idp-laws-and-policies/ (accessed 20 April 
2020). 
105 Phil Orchard, Protecting the Internally Displaced. Rhetoric 
and Reality (London and New York, NY: Routledge, 2018), 11. 
106 Ibid., 12. 
107 Behigu Habte and Yun Jin Kweon, “Addressing Internal 
Displacement in Ethiopia”, Forced Migration Review 59 (2018): 
40–42. 
for IDP children in national education law.108 From 
a development perspective, mainstreaming the con-
cerns of IDPs in national legislation is particularly 
promising if it makes existing structures more in-
clusive, instead of creating unsustainable parallel 
structures.109 
The 31 African states that have so far acceded to 
the Kampala Convention have, by ratifying it, com-
mitted themselves to transposing the provisions 
contained therein into national law. So far, only one 
state has done so: In December 2018, the National 
Assembly of Niger passed a law to this effect. This 
was preceded by an extensive national consultation 
process, supported by UNHCR and the Special Rap-
porteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced 
Persons, in which state actors as well as traditional 
and religious authorities participated.110 This example 
shows that international actors can help to give the 
Kampala Convention greater prominence in individual 
states, especially by supporting national administra-
tions. 
Persuasion at the regional level 
is more effective than economic 
sanctions or threatening 
military gestures. 
The overall slow progress in ratifying and imple-
menting the Convention indicates a lack of political 
will. Regional and (sub-)regional forums play an im-
portant role in driving the process forward, such 
as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, 
the Southern African Development Community, and 
the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS). Thematic exchanges among neighbouring 
countries, which often face similar challenges, can 
increase the willingness of national decision-makers 
 
108 Jacopo Giorgi, Regulatory Frameworks on Internal Dis-
placement. Global, Regional, and National Developments (Geneva: 
Global Protection Cluster, November 2016), 22. 
109 See Center on International Cooperation, Addressing 
Protracted Displacement: A Framework for Development-Humani-
tarian Cooperation (New York, NY, December 2015), 6. 
110 See UNHCR, “Niger Becomes First African Country to 
Adopt National Law for Protection and Assistance of Inter-
nally Displaced People”, Press Release (Geneva, 7 December 
2018), https://www.unhcr.org/afr/news/press/2018/12/ 
5c0a29eb4/niger-becomes-first-african-country-to-adopt-
national-law-for-protection.html (accessed 16 October 2019). 
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to commit themselves to the protection of IDPs.111 
In this area, the GP20 process has provided new im-
petus. Thus, Senegal and Cape Verde committed 
themselves to ratifying the Kampala Convention after 
a meeting of parliamentarians from ECOWAS coun-
tries with regional representatives of the GP20 process 
in March 2019.112 A quantitative study published 
in 2018 on the effectiveness of the UN Guiding Prin-
ciples on Internal Displacement supports the thesis 
that regional forums and actors play a central role. 
The results of the study show that persuasion at the 
regional level has a greater influence on the national 
implementation of the Guiding Principles than eco-
nomic sanctions or threatening military gestures.113 
This is an important lesson for future efforts to pro-
tect IDPs. 
 
111 Angela Cotroneo, “Strengthening Implementation of 
the Guiding Principles by Affected States”, Forced Migration 
Review 59 (2018): 29–31. 
112 Interviews with the ICRC and GP20 representatives, 
May 2019. 
113 Gabriel Cardona-Fox, Exile within Borders. A Global Look 
at Commitment to the International Regime to Protect Internally 
Displaced Persons, International Refugee Law Series, vol. 15 
(Leiden: Brill, 2018), 173f. 
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Internal displacement is often a direct consequence 
of wars and violent conflicts. In these situations, the 
most pressing challenges are not initially displace-
ment-specific. Instead, as is currently the case in 
Syria, the focus is on the much larger areas of conflict 
resolution, reconstruction, and reconciliation. Even in 
the event of devastating natural disasters, immediate 
emergency aid is the first priority for all those affected, 
whether or not they have been displaced. The circum-
stances are fundamentally different in the case of 
protracted displacement, that is, when disadvantages 
caused by displacement become permanent. In this 
case, the situation of those affected is not an inevi-
table consequence of acute triggers, but either politi-
cally intended, the result of political failures, or due 
to a lack of capacity on the part of the respective 
government. 
Protracted situations thus pose a dilemma for inter-
national actors who wish to help reduce the levels 
of internal displacement. On the one hand, there is a 
need for action specific to displacement that goes far 
beyond the usual repertoire of humanitarian aid. On 
the other hand, these cases point directly to govern-
ment culpability or government deficits and are there-
fore politically highly sensitive. International offers of 
support, which are primarily based on human rights, 
are often perceived by the governments of affected 
states as damaging to their reputations, and are there-
fore rejected as inadmissible interference in internal 
affairs. New approaches have been opened up by the 
shift in discourse in recent years from a purely rights-
based approach to a more development-oriented ap-
proach that appeals to the self-interests of states. But 
what are the concrete contributions that development 
actors can make in the context of internal displace-
ment? Following the UN Guiding Principles on Inter-
nal Displacement, it is useful to distinguish three 
phases, namely prevention, protracted displacement, 
and the search for durable solutions. 
Prevention 
In the area of prevention, development cooperation 
can play an important role through its standard, non-
displacement-specific activities and objectives. Since 
poor and marginalised population groups are often 
affected disproportionately by internal displacement, 
poverty reduction and democracy promotion are im-
portant pillars of any prevention strategy. However, 
such strategies differ depending on the context and 
cause of possible displacements. Crisis prevention 
is the best measure against internal displacement 
caused by conflict. In the run-up to violent conflicts, 
primarily foreign and security policy interventions 
are required. At an earlier stage, however, develop-
ment policy can make an important contribution 
by promoting good governance and strengthening 
human rights. Peace and reconciliation efforts can 
reduce the risk of recurring displacement, especially 
at the local level. 
Prevention of displacement must not 
lead to prescribed immobility. 
Displacements due to natural disasters, on the 
other hand, can be reduced by a number of measures, 
although not completely prevented. This includes dis-
seminating knowledge about natural events and mak-
ing long-term adjustments to settlement behaviour 
on this basis, as well as disaster control and sustaina-
ble infrastructure planning. In the case of slow-onset 
environmental changes, the range of possible preven-
tion strategies is wider. It comprises resilience pro-
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motion and climate adaptation strategies, which must 
always go hand in hand with measures to reduce struc-
tural discrimination against marginalised groups. In 
this area in particular, it is crucial that the prevention 
of displacement does not lead to prescribed immobili-
ty. On the one hand, it is the right of every individual 
to move freely within their own country. On the 
other hand, the line between voluntary and involun-
tary mobility is blurred because migration itself is a 
widespread climate adaptation strategy.114 
Entry Points in the Case of 
Protracted Displacement 
For a long time, ongoing displacement situations 
were regarded as a field of activity for humanitarian 
actors, whereas approaches to longer-term solutions 
were considered the responsibility of development 
actors. Now this sequence of involvement is being 
questioned. Even in cases whereby, for example, the 
return to the place of origin desired by those affected 
is not yet possible, efforts should be made to reduce 
the degree of marginalisation and vulnerability of 
IDPs and to increase their autonomy. In this way, 
they can be prepared for possible permanent solu-
tions later on.115 First and foremost, it is a matter of 
holding to account those state authorities who are 
responsible for safeguarding the rights of their own 
citizens. Development policy actors should therefore 
strengthen the capacity of local administrations in 
regions where IDPs have sought refuge, and support 
the competent authorities in developing infrastruc-
ture and basic services. This is essential in the event 
of longer-term displacement in order to prevent 
measures that were intended as emergency aid from 
becoming permanent as well as to keep parallel 
structures from emerging. IDPs in many countries 
need special support in accessing political rights and 
income opportunities. Both issues are crucial for 
strengthening the independence and self-determina-
tion of those affected. Although IDPs may have spe-
cific needs, it is important to recognise at the same 
time the need to support persons not affected by 
 
114 Sarah Opitz Stapleton et al., Climate Change, Migration 
and Displacement. The Need for a Risk-informed and Coherent Ap-
proach (London and New York, NY: ODI and UNDP, November 
2017). 
115 Kälin and Chapuisat, Breaking the Impasse (see note 10), 
23f. 
displacement in order to prevent distribution con-
flicts. More and more area-based approaches are 
therefore being established that support all persons 
residing in a region, and thus also take into account 
the needs of the host communities. 
Development actors can also make a further sig-
nificant contribution by promoting the open and 
transparent handling of internal displacement, which 
is still often a taboo subject. Efforts by human rights 
actors in this direction are easily perceived as unjus-
tified criticism from the outside. Development actors, 
on the other hand, can use their existing access to 
state actors to draw attention to the costs and risks 
to society as a whole, especially those costs and risks 
that arise in the context of protracted internal dis-
placement. This would benefit a political culture in 
which the topic is openly discussed. This kind of 
open-discussion culture, as well as systematic data 
collection, is a basic requirement for developing effec-
tive solutions. 
Durable Solutions 
The concept of durable solutions is based on the 
assumption that the special needs of IDPs do not 
end when they have found temporary protection, 
nor when the original reason for their displacement 
ceases to exist. Irrespective of their future place of 
residence, internal displacement is only deemed to 
have ended when the persons concerned no longer 
have a need for support due to displacement, and 
they enjoy the same access to rights as fellow citizens 
not affected by displacement.116 
As in all issues related to internal displacement, 
state actors are first and foremost obliged to protect 
the rights of their own citizens. During this phase, 
development actors can make constructive contribu-
tions in two ways. Firstly, they should work to ensure 
that the concerns of IDPs are systematically taken into 
account in national development plans and sectoral 
policy processes. On the other hand, the path towards 
durable solutions must be shaped in a participatory 
manner. Only if those affected are involved in the 
planning and management processes can it be en-
sured that their rights and needs are being taken into 
account. One example is the free choice of place of 
residence within one’s own country: Depending on 
 
116 Kälin, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on 
the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons (see note 78), 1. 
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the political context, state actors have a clear pref-
erence for or against the early return of displaced 
persons to their previous places of residence. How-
ever, both forced return and resettlement in response 
to state pressure perpetuate the discrimination of 
IDPs vis-à-vis their fellow citizens. Durable solutions 
can only be achieved if IDPs are enabled to make 
voluntary and informed decisions on where they wish 
to settle in the long term. 
In all efforts to find durable solutions, it must be 
recognised that an ideal result cannot be achieved in 
every situation, and not for every person concerned. 
In many cases, voluntary return also means returning 
to the place where violence was previously experi-
enced. Even if those affected were to return to the 
same place as before, this would not necessarily 
mean that they would still feel at home there in the 
future.117 Particularly in the case of conflict-induced 
displacement, it is important to supplement the 
rights-based perspective – with the individual at its 
centre – with a perspective that takes account of 
the concerns of local communities. It is essential to 
involve those affected in peace processes if conflicts 
are to be permanently settled and the risk of recur-
ring displacement reduced. Yet, comprehensive peace 
and reconciliation work also involves weighing up 
different models of reparation. If, after the settlement 
of major violent conflicts, extensive individual com-
pensation payments are enshrined into law without 
ensuring implementation, this raises expectations 
that cannot be fulfilled. In such cases, it may be more 
effective and conducive to longer-term peace and 
stability to give clear priority to the establishment 
of rule-of-law structures and an inclusive political 
system. 
 
117 Megan Bradley, “Durable Solutions and the Right 
of Return for IDPs: Evolving Interpretations”, International 
Journal of Refugee Law 30, no. 2 (2018): 218–42. 
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The high and rising numbers of IDPs entail economic 
and societal costs and increase the risk of violent con-
flict. The international community must therefore 
urgently seek durable solutions and prevent further 
displacement. The change in perspective towards a 
more developmentally oriented approach to internal 
displacement opens up new options for action. The 
German government should pool its resources and, 
above all, commit itself to durable solutions. Two 
conditions must be met. First, it is essential that more 
reliable data is generated. Second, it is important to 
identify windows of opportunity for policy initiatives 
in countries with internal displacement, both at the 
national and sub-national levels. 
Important partners in this work are not only the 
relevant UN organisations, but also the non-govern-
mental organisations IDMC and JIPS, which focus on 
internal displacement. IDMC is increasingly relying 
on a local presence to make use of existing data on 
internal displacement and to strengthen the political 
will of national decision-makers to confront the 
phenomenon. This international presence is a rela-
tively new facet of IDMC’s work and requires new 
sources of funding. The local needs assessments 
conducted by JIPS, on the other hand, are an ideal 
starting point for targeted development programmes. 
Overall, a development-oriented approach is gaining 
more and more ground in tackling internal displace-
ment. However, it should not be seen as an alterna-
tive but as a complement to the human rights-based 
approach that has prevailed to date. One practical 
step towards strengthening the link between the two 
worlds would be to initiate a secondment from the 
Office of the Special Representative for the Human 
Rights of Internally Displaced Persons to the UNDP 
Crisis Bureau. The German government could shoul-
der the costs for this. 
The central political challenge is the tension be-
tween national sovereignty and external engagement. 
Therefore, real progress in the field of internal dis-
placement can only be achieved with the agreement 
of the states concerned. The composition of the 
recently established UN High-Level Panel on Internal 
Displacement gives reason to hope that some of the 
states represented there are prepared to provide new 
impetus at the international level. The German gov-
ernment should support this process. It should work 
at the UN level to ensure that the combined experi-
ence of the High-Level Panel and the GP20 Plan of 
Action results in a longer-term, state-led process that 
makes the international community more capable of 
acting in the context of internal displacement. Under 
no circumstances, however, should these process-
oriented innovations mask the urgent need for action 
in the existing institutional structure. One step in the 
right direction would be to improve the financial and 
human resources of the office of the UN Special Rap-
porteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced 
Persons. Politically, however, it would be much more 
effective to re-establish the post of a UN Special Rep-
resentative for Internally Displaced Persons, reporting 
directly to the UN Secretary-General. 
A central and urgent task is to adapt existing finan-
cial instruments to the actual needs arising from in-
ternal displacement. The German government should 
set a good example. It should provide flexible and 
multi-annual funds that do not force an artificial 
separation between short- and longer-term support 
measures. It should also explore the potential of 
financial instruments that follow a proactive rather 
than a reactive logic in the sense of “anticipatory 
action”, and it should advocate appropriate reforms 
at the international level.118 
 
118 For the concept “anticipatory action”, see Mark Low-
cock, Anticipation Saves Lives: How Data and Innovative Financing 
Can Help Improve the World’s Response to Humanitarian Crises 
(London, 2 December 2019), https://reliefweb.int/report/ 
world/mark-lowcock-under-secretary-general-humanitarian-
affairs-and-emergency-relief (accessed 19 December 2019). 
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Germany is an important country of destination 
for migrants and refugees alike. One of the conse-
quences of this is that the return of rejected asylum 
seekers and other persons without legal residence 
status is of great domestic political importance. How-
ever, in view of the far-reaching negative effects 
of internal displacement, the German government 
should endeavour to avoid returning them to their 
home countries if, upon return, they will end up as 
IDPs. This, in turn, requires a revised definition of 
what constitutes a successful return. 
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